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From Solon to Sophocles: Intertextuality and Interpretation in 
Sophocles’ Antigone 
 
Douglas Cairns 
 
This paper develops from my discussion of the role of traditional Greek thought, and 
especially the concept of ἄτη, in Sophocles’ Antigone in a recent volume on 
Tragedy and Archaic Greek Thought. It also complements and extends a more 
general interpretation of the play offered in my forthcoming Bloomsbury 
Companion to Antigone.
1
 Its main focus is the first and second stasima of 
Sophocles’ play and in particular on what they, their relations with each other, and 
their relations with other texts, contribute to an overall interpretation. 
 
1. The first stasimon 
The first stasimon is associated above all with fifth-century accounts of progress.
2
 
This is not what I propose to discuss here, but these associations do form an 
important background to what I do want to focus on, because contemporary 
affirmations of the human potential for progress – the belief, generally speaking, that 
technological and cultural progress depend on the rational capacities that have 
allowed human beings to master their natural environment and establish civilized 
communities – stand in sharp contrast to what might be regarded as the traditional 
‘archaic’ view of a decline from better to worse conditions of existence.3 What I 
                                                 
1
 See Cairns (2013), (2014). I am grateful to audiences in (chronologically) St Andrews, Edinburgh, 
Tokyo, and Heidelberg for their comments on oral versions of this paper. I am especially delighted to 
be able to publish this version here in JASCA alongside the fine and complementary study of the first 
stasimon by Yoshinori Sano and I am very grateful to Professor Sano for advance sight of his work. I 
should also like to thank Professors Anzai, Ciesko, Itsumi, Kasai, Nakatsukasa, Sano, Takahashi, and 
their colleagues, students, family, and friends for their splendid hospitality in summer 2013. 
2
 The texts are assembled and analysed by Y. Sano in this volume. Among other studies see esp. 
Utzinger (2003); cf. Segal (1964) = (1986), 137-61; Guthrie (1969), 60-8, 79-84; Goldhill (1986), 
202-5. 
3
 See Hes. Op. 106-201. Starkey (2013) takes me to task for using ‘traditional’ and ‘archaic’ 
interchangeably and objects ‘that a traditional feature need not be specifically archaic and might not 
seem out of place in any period of Greek literature’. In this context, I use both terms to refer to 
widespread and recurrent ethical and religious notions that can be found in poetry from Homer to 
Aeschylus (and, of course, beyond). I call this ‘archaic poetry’, though periodization as such is not 
my concern. Since all our evidence for this complex of ideas before Sophocles comes from archaic 
poetry, all such traditional ideas are archaic. There are, of course, ideas that may be associated with 
writers of the archaic period (especially the Presocratics) that are not traditional. But I am dealing 
with those that are. It is true that many of these ideas continue to be traditional long after Sophocles, 
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shall say here will confirm (in general terms) familiar interpretations of the first 
stasimon, especially those that identify irony, ambivalence, and latent reference to 
Creon.
4
 I argue that these interpretations are reinforced by a fuller understanding of 
the ode’s intertextuality with earlier poetry (as well as by intratextual relationships 
with the rest of Sophocles’ play, especially its second stasimon). 
As examples of human skill (τέχνη) the Chorus offer seafaring (334-7), 
agriculture (337-41), hunting and fishing (342-8), the taming of animals (348-52), 
language, thought, and law (354-6), house-building (365-60), and medicine (361-3). 
But there are limits: medicine cannot in the end protect us from death (Ἅιδα μόνον | 
φεῦξιν οὐκ ἐπάξεται, 361-2). And there are qualifications: skill has bad as well as 
good applications, bad as well as good outcomes (σοφόν τι τὸ μηχανόεν | τέχνας 
ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδ’ ἔχων | τοτὲ μὲν κακόν, ἄλλοτ’ ἐπ’ ἐσθλὸν ἕρπει, 365-7). The limits 
and ambivalence of τέχνη that are explicit in these lines are implicit throughout the 
ode, right from its striking (and strikingly ambiguous) opening phrase (πολλὰ τὰ 
δεινὰ κτλ.). The activity of ploughing that is central to the development of 
agriculture involves ‘wearing away the oldest (and most reverend) of the gods, earth 
the unwaning, the unwearying’ (θεῶν | τε τὰν ὑπερτάταν, Γᾶν | ἄφθιτον, 
ἀκαμάταν ἀποτρύεται, 337-9).
5
 ‘Thought’ (φρόνημα) is ‘windy’ (ἀνεμόεν, 354-
5), suggesting speed, but also lack of substance. Φρόνημα (a word which has 
already been used by Creon in lines 176 and 207 in a way that invites an audience to 
evaluate his way of thinking as it is tested in practice)
6
 can also mean ‘pride’. Man 
has ‘taught himself the dispositions, ὀργαί, of civic order’ (ἀστυνόμους | ὀργὰς 
ἐδιδάξατο, 355-6); but ὀργή is an emotion of which Creon has already given ample 
evidence in his response to the news of Polynices’ burial (244, 280-314), especially 
in his reaction to the suggestion that the deed may be the work of the gods (280: 
παῦσαι, πρὶν ὀργῆς καί με μεστῶσαι λέγων). Man has resources for everything 
(παντοπόρος, 360); he advances towards nothing that is to come without  resources 
(ἄπορος ἐπ’ οὐδὲν ἔρχεται | τὸ μέλλον, 360-1). But the notion that man is 
resourceful in all respects is immediately contradicted in the reference to death (361-
                                                                                                                                         
and thus are not confined to archaic poetry, but this is not relevant, since the issue here is what 
Sophocles has taken from the shared cultural background of his own and earlier periods, i.e. from 
traditional, archaic Greek thought. I had not thought it necessary to spell this out; but evidently it is. 
4
 For ambivalent readings of the ode, cf. Goheen (1951), 53-6; Kirkwood (1958), 205-6; Linforth 
(1961), 196-9; Müller (1967), 83-9; Coleman (1972), 10; Gellie (1972), 36-7; Benardete (1999), 40-
9; Goldhill (1986), 204-5; Nussbaum (1986), 73-5; Ditmars (1992), 47-8, 58; Susanetti (2012), 223; 
contrast Knox (1979), 168-72; Brown (1987), 154-5. 
5
 Cf. Benardete (1999), 41-5; Susanetti (2012), 228-9. 
6
 See further below. 
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2), and the sense of being prepared for every eventuality is precisely what is 
described in the next stanza (365-7) as the kind of cleverness or skill that is ‘beyond 
hope’, yet only sometimes successful. 
The ode has two especially prominent Athenian forebears: Solon 13. 43-62 W,
7
 
and the opening lines of the first stasimon of Aeschylus’ Choephori (585-601).8 
 
1.1. Solon 13 W 
Solon’s Musenelegie is clearly a poem that fifth-century Athenians knew well. 
Bacchylides makes use of it in praising an Athenian victor at the Isthmian games in 
his tenth Ode (35-48). That ode is undateable: but if (as is plausible, but not certain) 
Bacchylides died around 452 BC and the Antigone was produced in the 450s or 440s, 
it will show a ready familiarity with Solon’s poem at Athens at a period close to that 
in which the Antigone was performed.
9
 
The relevant passage of Solon’s poem, like the beginning of Ode to Man, takes 
the form of a Priamel of human skills (43-62): 
 
σπεύδει δ’ ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος· ὁ μὲν κατὰ πόντον ἀλᾶται 
 ἐν νηυσὶν χρῄζων οἴκαδε κέρδος ἄγειν 
ἰχθυόεντ’ ἀνέμοισι φορεόμενος ἀργαλέοισιν,    45 
 φειδωλὴν ψυχῆς οὐδεμίαν θέμενος· 
ἄλλος γῆν τέμνων πολυδένδρεον εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν 
 λατρεύει, τοῖσιν καμπύλ’ ἄροτρα μέλει· 
ἄλλος Ἀθηναίης τε καὶ Ἡφαίστου πολυτέχνεω 
 ἔργα δαεὶς χειροῖν ξυλλέγεται βίοτον,     50 
ἄλλος Ὀλυμπιάδων Μουσέων πάρα δῶρα διδαχθείς, 
 ἱμερτῆς σοφίης μέτρον ἐπιστάμενος· 
ἄλλον μάντιν ἔθηκεν ἄναξ ἑκάεργος Ἀπόλλων, 
 ἔγνω δ’ ἀνδρὶ κακὸν τηλόθεν ἐρχόμενον 
ᾧ συνομαρτήσωσι θεοί· τὰ δὲ μόρσιμα πάντως    55 
                                                 
7
 See Friedländer (1967), 191-2. The general relevance of Sol. 13 to the first stasimon is noted by 
Müller (1967), 87, though he does not discuss the detailed correspondences. Cf. his p. 139 on the 
second stasimon, with Gagné (2013), 373-6. See also Sano, in this volume, 33, 46. 
8
 Cf. Friedländer (1967), 190-1; Linforth (1961), 196; Coleman (1972), 10; Burton (1980), 96; Staley 
(1985), esp. 565-8; Garvie (1986), 204; Crane (1989), 105. Cf. Sano, in this volume, 33, 39-40. The 
link between the two texts also struck Hölderlin (Steiner (1984), 89).  
9
 On the dating of Bacchylides’ life and work, see Cairns (2010), 1-7. The date of the Antigone is 
unknown, and the indications that it belongs to the 440s much less persuasive than is sometimes 
supposed (see e.g. Scullion (2002) 85-6). But the general point stands regardless of the uncertainty 
over dating. On the afterlife of the Musenelegie at Athens, cf. Gagné (2013), 227, 375. 
JASCA 2 (2014) 
 6 
 οὔτε τις οἰωνὸς ῥύσεται οὔθ’ ἱερά· 
ἄλλοι Παιῶνος πολυφαρμάκου ἔργον ἔχοντες 
 ἰητροί· καὶ τοῖς οὐδὲν ἔπεστι τέλος· 
πολλάκι δ’ ἐξ ὀλίγης ὀδύνης μέγα γίγνεται ἄλγος, 
 κοὐκ ἄν τις λύσαιτ’ ἤπια φάρμακα δούς·     60 
τὸν δὲ κακαῖς νούσοισι κυκώμενον ἀργαλέαις τε 
 ἁψάμενος χειροῖν αἶψα τίθησ’ ὑγιῆ 
 
In both cases, a summary Priamel is followed by a more extensive list of examples 
(σπεύδει δ’ ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος, Sol. 13. 43; cf. πολλὰ τὰ δεινά, Ant. 332). Several 
examples occur in both lists.
10
 The first two are the same and appear in the same 
order in both; and the last member of each list is the same.
11
 
 
 Solon 13 Ant. 
seafaring 43-6 333-7 
agriculture and ploughing  47-8 337-41 
medicine  57-62 361-4 
 
Solon’s list has items that the Ode to Man does not. All Solon’s skills are ways of 
making money, whereas in Sophocles they are all ways of mastering the natural 
environment and developing civilized communities. One of these items in Solon’s 
list that does not appear in the Antigone is seercraft (53-6 – unless we think that 
ὀρνίθων in Ant. 342-3 evokes οἰωνός at Sol. 13. 56). But it nonetheless illuminates 
one aspect of Sophocles’ version. Like Solon’s seer, Sophocles’ ‘man’ has resources 
vis-à-vis the future (ἄπορος ἐπ’ οὐδὲν ἔρχεται | τὸ μέλλον,  Ant. 360-1); but seers 
have powers that ordinary men do not. According to Solon (13. 54), a seer can 
discern the evil that is coming to a man (ἔγνω δ’ ἀνδρὶ κακὸν τηλόθεν 
ἐρχόμενον); but not even his skill can avert what is fated (τὰ δὲ μόρσιμα πάντως | 
οὔτε τις οἰωνὸς ῥύσεται οὔθ’ ἱερά, 55-6). Just so, the resources of ‘man’ in the first 
stasimon of the Antigone are of no avail in the face of the ineluctability of death. We 
notice, too, an identical sequence of ideas in both cases: (a) powers with regard to 
                                                 
10
 Cf. Sano, this volume, 33, 46. 
11
 Crane (1989), 107, notes the third item, but not the other two. 
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the future (Sol. 13. 53-6 ~ Ant. 360-1); (b) limitations of those powers (Sol. 13. 55-6 
~ Ant. 361-2); (c) medicine (Sol. 13. 57-62 ~ Ant. 363-4). 
This notion of limitation is then applied to all the examples in Solon’s list (63-
6): Moira brings mortals κακόν as well as ἐσθλόν (63); the gifts of the gods are 
inescapable (64); there is risk in every activity (65); and no one knows how things, 
once started, are going to end (65-6; note μέλλει in 66). With this, we can compare 
Ant. 360-2, 365-71: though man seems to advance towards nothing that is to come 
without resources (360-1, note μέλλον in 361), still people who put their hopes in 
skill and intelligence come to κακόν as well as to ἐσθλόν (365-7); there is a god 
that no one can escape (361-2); and intelligence can be misused, in violation of 
human law and divine justice (368-71). 
We shall return to these topics. 
 
1.2. Aeschylus, Choephori 585-601 
The other major Athenian intertext is the first stasimon of Aeschylus’ Choephori 
(585-651), especially its first two stanzas. 
 
πολλὰ μὲν γᾶ τρέφει        585 
 δεινὰ δειμάτων ἄχη, 
πόντιαί τ’ ἀγκάλαι 
βρύουσι· βλάπτουσι καὶ πεδαίχμιοι 
λαμπάδες πεδάοροι       590 
πτανά τε καὶ πεδοβάμονα· κἀνεμόεντ’ ἂν 
αἰγίδων φράσαι κότον. 
 
ἀλλ’ ὑπέρτολμον ἀν- 
δρὸς φρόνημα τίς λέγοι      595 
καὶ γυναικῶν φρεσὶν 
τλημόνων παντόλμους 
ἔρωτας, ἄταισι συννόμους βροτῶν; 
ξυζύγους δ’ ὁμαυλίας 
θηλυκρατὴς ἀπέρωτος ἔρως παρανικᾷ    600 
κνωδάλων τε καὶ βροτῶν. 
 
589 βλάστουσι codd., βλάπτουσι Butler 
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This also begins with a Priamel, but more than that, its opening words (πολλὰ μὲν 
γᾶ τρέφει δεινὰ δειμάτων ἄχη, 585-6) are closely similar to the Antigone’s πολλὰ 
τὰ δεινά, 332. Aeschylus’ personified Ge who nurtures these terrors is recalled in 
the Ge who is worn down by the plough in Sophocles (Γᾶν ἄφθιτον, ἀκαμάταν 
ἀποτρύεται, 338-9). The first stanza of the Aeschylean ode encompasses earth, sea, 
and sky (585-93); in the first two stanzas of the Sophoclean one (332-45) there is a 
chiastic movement from sea (πόντου), to earth (Γᾶν), to sky (φῦλον ὀρνίθων) and 
then back to earth (θηρῶν ἀγρίων ἔθνη) and sea (πόντου τ’ εἰναλίαν φύσιν). Like 
the Ode to Man, the Choephori’s ode encompasses both birds of the air and beasts of 
the field (πτανά τε καὶ πεδοβάμονα, 591). Aeschylus’ Chorus then proceeds to 
focus on the ‘excessively daring φρόνημα of man’ (594-5): ὑπέρτολμον answers to 
τόλμα at Ant. 371-2; φρόνημα (here clearly in its negative sense) occurs also at 
Antigone 355 (where the adjective ἀνεμόεις also has its counterpart at Cho. 591); 
and ἀνδρός answers to the ἀνήρ who, by Antigone 347, has replaced the ἄνθρωπος 
with whom the ode began (332-3).
12 
The climax of the Aeschylean Priamel, however, is the wicked ἔρωτες of 
women (596-8, 599-601), a point that is then illustrated by the catalogue of bad 
women who serve as analogues to Clytemnestra. The link between the Sophoclean 
ode and the preceding action of the play is not explicit until the end of the song 
(368-75). Ostensibly, the Chorus indicate here that the preceding reflexions on 
human ingenuity were prompted by the attempted burial of Polynices’ body: that 
action required the kind of daring that demonstrates the negative side of human 
intelligence. The Chorus assume (as did Creon at 248) that the perpetrator is a man. 
The audience, however, know that it was a woman, and will see the irony not only in 
the reference to περιφραδὴς ἀνήρ at 348 but also in the evocation of the 
Choephori’s powerful ode on female crime. But in that ode, too, doubts about the 
φρόνημα of men were raised as a counterpoint to women’s wickedness. Sophocles’ 
ode also raises the question of whether right, in this instance, lies with the woman or 
the man. We know that it was a woman who performed the burial; but is that woman 
a criminal, as in the Choephori, or does the daring that the Chorus condemn belong 
to the man who sought to exert his mastery over earth, supreme of the gods (338), 
and over Hades (361)? How stable is his ‘windy φρόνημα’? Will his ὀργαί 
preserve the city’s laws (354-5) or will they fall foul of the ‘laws of the land (or 
                                                 
12
 The phrase ἀνδρὸς φρόνημα (Cho. 594-5) will appear in the same form and with the same sense in 
the Antigone’s next episode, in Antigone’s boast that she is not the sort to break divine law ἀνδρὸς 
οὐδενὸς φρόνημα δείσασα, 458-9. 
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earth) and the justice of the gods’ (νόμους … χθονὸς | θεῶν τ’ ἔνορκον δίκαν, 
368-9)? The Ode to Man responds to the confidence in his own powers that Creon 
manifested in his opening speech, and to characteristics that he had already begun to 
manifest in his interactions with the Chorus and the Guard, not only to the supposed 
ingenuity of the transgressor who buried the body.
13
 For an audience that is aware of 
them, both of the ode’s major intertexts raise, from the very beginning of the Ode to 
Man, the issues of right and wrong that arise explicitly only in that song’s final 
stanza (365-75). Both might be said to present those issues within a traditional, 
‘archaic’ moral and theological framework. The Ode to Man combines these 
influences with a more contemporary-sounding praise of human achievement and 
progress, but both intertextuality and the ode’s internal ambivalences suggest that its 
optimistic orientation is only superficial.
14
 It is the ode’s closing emphasis on the 
limits and ambivalence of human ingenuity that contextualize it, within its 
immediate context, within the play in general, and within wider traditions of Greek 
thought. 
 
2. Second stasimon 
Solon’s Priamel in the Musenelegie is embedded in a disquisition on the power of 
fate, the instability of fortune, the ambivalence of wealth, and the prevalence of 
ἄτη.
15
 Ἄτη first appears (in 68) as a consequence of the inability to foresee the 
outcome of one’s actions: at the beginning of an enterprise nobody knows how it 
will turn out. One can try to achieve a good outcome, yet fall into ἄτη without 
realizing it, or one may be faring badly, and yet find that things turn out well (65-
70): 
 
πᾶσι δέ τοι κίνδυνος ἐπ’ ἔργμασιν, οὐδέ τις οἶδεν    65 
 πῇ μέλλει σχήσειν χρήματος ἀρχομένου· 
ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν εὖ ἔρδειν πειρώμενος οὐ προνοήσας 
 ἐς μεγάλην ἄτην καὶ χαλεπὴν ἔπεσεν, 
τῷ δὲ κακῶς ἔρδοντι θεὸς περὶ πάντα δίδωσιν 
συντυχίην ἀγαθήν, ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης.     70 
 
                                                 
13
 Cf. Else (1976), 46; also (at least in general terms), Crane (1989). 
14
 So in general Müller (1967), 87-8; contrast Staley (1985), 561; Crane (1989), 107. 
15
 For the purposes of this paper I pass over the much-discussed issue of the coherence or otherwise 
of Solon’s argument in this poem. For a good overview, with full doxography, see Noussia-Fantuzzi 
(2010), 127-39; more recently, cf. Versnel (2011), 201-6. 
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Ἄτη then recurs in 75-6, as punishment for greed and the illegitimate pursuit of 
πλοῦτος and κέρδος (71-6): 
 
πλούτου δ’ οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται· 
 οἳ γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων πλεῖστον ἔχουσι βίον, 
διπλάσιον σπεύδουσι· τίς ἂν κορέσειεν ἅπαντας; 
 κέρδεά τοι θνητοῖς ὤπασαν ἀθάνατοι, 
ἄτη δ’ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνεται, ἣν ὁπότε Ζεὺς     75 
πέμψῃ τεισομένην, ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει. 
 
This concludes what we have of the poem, and perhaps the entire original poem, by 
forming a ring with the concentration on good and bad ways of attaining wealth, on 
the dangers of ὕβρις and ἄτη, and on the inevitability of Zeus’ punishment, even 
across the generations, which occupies its first 42 lines. If the first stasimon of the 
Antigone recalls Solon’s poem, then it must also recall its wider ethical framework. 
Equally, if the first stasimon of Antigone reminds its audience of the first stasimon 
of the Choephori, then that audience will think not only of its juxtaposition of male 
φρόνημα and female criminality, but also of the result of women’s villainous 
ἔρωτες, i.e. ἆται, disasters (597-8). In the relation between the Ode to Man and its 
intertexts, ἄτη is the elephant in the room. And ἄτη is the subject of the second 
stasimon. 
 
2.1. First and second stasima compared 
The second stasimon begins with μακαρισμός: happy are those whose life is free of 
the taste of misfortune (εὐδαίμονες οἷσι κακῶν ἄγευστος αἰών, 582); but 
εὐδαιμονία is impossible in a house that is shaken by the gods; in that case, all that 
remains is ἄτη (οἷς γὰρ ἂν σεισθῇ θεόθεν δόμος, ἄτας | οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει γενεᾶς 
ἐπὶ πλῆθος ἕρπον, 583-5). Just such a house is the House of Labdacus, whose 
generations of trouble are continuing in the sufferings of its surviving members, and 
particularly in the death penalty that (in the preceding scene) was pronounced on 
both Antigone and Ismene (594-603). This is the first pair of stanzas. In the second 
pair, the Chorus sing first that the transgression of men (and again the word is 
ἄνδρες, 604-5) will never overcome the power of Zeus, and of the ἄτη that appears 
(despite the textual uncertainty) especially to attend the rich or the successful.
16
 
                                                 
16
 The manuscript text (οὐδὲν ἕρπει | θνατῶν βιότῳ πάμπολις ἐκτὸς ἄτας) is emended in two main 
ways: in the version printed in Lloyd-Jones and Wilson’s Oxford Classical Text (Lloyd-Jones’s own 
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They then
 
proceed to the hopes and delusions that lead men (ἄνδρες again, 616) 
blindly to act in ways that bring disaster (615-20), before concluding with an 
endorsement of the traditional wisdom that ‘sooner or later bad seems good to a man 
whose mind a god is leading towards disaster (ἄτη). He fares but the shortest time 
without ἄτη’ (620-5): 
 
σοφίᾳ γὰρ ἔκ του       620 
κλεινὸν ἔπος πέφανται, 
τὸ κακὸν δοκεῖν ποτ’ ἐσθλὸν 
τῷδ’ ἔμμεν ὅτῳ φρένας 
θεὸς ἄγει πρὸς ἄταν· 
πράσσει δ’ ὀλίγιστoν χρόνον ἐκτὸς ἄτας.17      625 
 
The first and second stasima are linked by a series of verbal and conceptual 
echoes.
18
 In particular, their beginnings are closely parallel. They both begin with 
arresting, proverbial-sounding, stylized, and universalizing statements, before 
proceeding to a more specific case: 
 
πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κοὐδὲν ἀν-  
θρώπου δεινότερον πέλει. (332-3) 
εὐδαίμονες οἷσι κακῶν ἄγευστος αἰών.  
οἷς γὰρ ἂν σεισθῇ θεόθεν δόμος, ἄτας  
οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει γενεᾶς ἐπὶ πλῆθος ἕρπον. (583-5) 
 
In the first stasimon, the first example of mankind’s ingenuity is seafaring (334-7); 
in the second, the divine ‘shaking’ of a house, which entails all kinds of ἄτη, is 
compared to a storm at sea (586-93): 
 
τοῦτο καὶ πολιοῦ πέραν 
πόντου χειμερίῳ νότῳ  
χωρεῖ, περιβρυχίοισιν 
περῶν ὑπ’ οἴδμασιν (334-7) 
ὥστε ποντίας ἁλὸς 
οἶδμα δυσπνόοις ὅταν 
Θρῄσσησιν ἔρεβος ὕφαλον ἐπιδράμῃ πνοαῖς, 
κυλίνδει βυσσόθεν  
κελαινὰν θῖνα καὶ δυσάνεμοι 
στόνῳ βρέμουσιν ἀντιπλῆγες ἀκταί. (587-92) 
 
                                                                                                                                         
οὐδέν’ ἕρπει | θνατῶν βίοτος πάμπολυς ἐκτὸς ἄτας) the reference to wealth is clearer, but the 
implication is there even with Heath’s emendation, οὐδὲν ἕρπει | θνατῶν βιότῳ πάμπολύ γ’ ἐκτὸς 
ἄτας, printed by Jebb and Dawe. 
17
 ὀλίγιστoν (Bergk) for MSS’ ὀλίγοστoν. Lloyd-Jones’s ὀλίγος τὸν seems to me flat by comparison. 
18
 See Easterling (1978), 150; Sano (this volume) 40 and n. 44. 
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The link is reinforced by verbal echoes of the root ποντ- (335, 345/586) and the 
(ominous?) word οἶδμα (337/587). Perhaps, too, the metaphorical winds that 
represent ἄτη (a state of mind as well as a state of affairs) in the second stasimon 
recall the ‘windy thought’ of the first (especially δυσάνεμοι, 591, and ἀνεμόεν, 
353).
19 
However that may be, it is clear that the sea in the first stasimon represents 
human achievement, but in the second its limits. 
The second stasimon then moves on to the House of Labdacus, while the next 
point in the first stasimon is mankind’s invention of agriculture, but again the two 
themes are closely linked. 
 
 
Mankind wears away Earth, supreme of the gods, the immortal (ἄφθιτον), the 
unwearied (ἀκαμάταν), as the plough turns, ἔτος εἰς ἔτος (338-40); in the House of 
Labdacus woe falls on woe in a similar, incessant rhythm (πήματα φθιτῶν ἐπὶ 
πήμασι πίπτοντ’); and where Earth is ἄφθιτος and ἀκάματος, the Labdacids 
experience further woes over and above those of the dead (φθιτῶν, 595); in the 
second stasimon it is the ‘months of the gods’ (ἀκάματοι θεῶν | μῆνες, 607-8), 
through which the power of Zeus remains undiminished, that are ‘unwearied’. Earth 
is oldest and most august of the gods, but the Labdacids are the gods’ victims (θεῶν 
in 337 and 597, 607); and the agriculture that is a sign of human inventiveness in the 
first stasimon is echoed in the ‘harvesting’ (κατ’  … ἀμᾷ) of the ‘last root’ of the 
house of Oedipus (599-602). There is no escape (οὐδ’ ἔχει λύσιν, 597), just as there 
                                                 
19
 For winds/storms as an image of psychological disturbance, see the parodos, 134-7 (of Capaneus) 
and esp. the Chorus’ judgement of Antigone at 929-30 (ἔτι τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνέμων αὑταὶ | ψυχῆς ῥιπαὶ 
τήνδε γ’ ἔχουσιν); cf. Benardete (1999), 114; Cullyer (2005), 15-18. The association of such winds 
with ἄτη (e.g. A. Ag. 819. ἄτης θύελλαι ζῶσι; cf. esp. the storm which represents Zeus’ punishment, 
and thus the ἄτη which follows ὕβρις, in Sol. 13. 11-25 W) suggests a folk etymology deriving ἄτη 
from ἄημι (Goebel (1877), 32-55; Francis (1983)). NB also the correspondence between 1274 (Creon 
has been shaken by a god) and 584 (when a house is shaken by the gods). 
θεῶν 
τε τὰν ὑπερτάταν, Γᾶν 
ἄφθιτον, ἀκαμάταν ἀποτρύεται, 
ἰλλομένων ἀρότρων ἔτος εἰς ἔτος,  
ἱππείῳ γένει πολεύων. (337-41) 
ἀρχαῖα τὰ Λαβδακιδᾶν οἴκων ὁρῶμαι  
πήματα φθιτῶν ἐπὶ πήμασι πίπτοντ’,   
οὐδ’ ἀπαλλάσσει γενεὰν γένος, ἀλλ’ ἐρείπει 
θεῶν τις, οὐδ’ ἔχει λύσιν. 
νῦν γὰρ ἐσχάτας ὐπὲρ 
ῥίζας ἐτέτατο φάος ἐν Οἰδίπου δόμοις·  
κατ’ αὖ νιν φοινία 
θεῶν τῶν νερτέρων ἀμᾷ κόνις, 
λόγου τ’ ἄνοια καὶ φρενῶν Ἐρινύς. (593-603) 
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was no escape from death, in the first stasimon’s most explicit statement of the 
limits of human resourcefulness (362). 
The second stasimon also resembles the first in narrowing its focus from 
humanity in general to men in particular (ἄνδρες, 604-5, 616; ἀνήρ, 348). This is 
notable in both cases, given that the event that prompts the first is what the audience 
know to have been the act of a woman, while the ruminations on the fate of the 
Labdacids in the second are prompted by a man’s imposition of the death penalty 
upon its two surviving members, both female. 
In the first stasimon, speech (φθέγμα) and thought (φρόνημα) were central to 
man’s achievement (354-5), while in the second ‘senselessness in speech and a Fury 
of the mind’ cause the extirpation of the House of Oedipus (λόγου τ’ ἄνοια καὶ 
φρενῶν Ἐρινύς, 603). In the second stasimon, minds can be led, by a god, towards 
ἄτη (ὅτῳ φρένας | θεὸς ἄγει πρὸς ἄταν, 623-4), for it is a law (νόμος, 613) that 
no mortal transgression can restrain the power of Zeus (τεάν, Ζεῦ, δύνασιν τίς ἀν-| 
δρῶν ὑπερβασία κατάσχοι; 604-5); while in the first, man’s ἀστύνομοι ὀργαί 
(355-6) needed to respect both the law of the land and the justice of the gods 
(νόμους … χθονὸς | θεῶν τ’ ἔνορκον δίκαν) if he was to be high in his city (368-
70). 
In the first stasimon, man advanced towards the future (τὸ μέλλον) confident 
that his resources would suffice (360-1); but in the second it is the law of Zeus, the 
law that confirms his power and dictates that no great wealth (or nothing great) 
comes to mortals without ἄτη, that prevails ‘now and in the future (τὸ μέλλον) and 
in the past’ (611-12). Hope (ἐλπίς) may be no more than ‘the deception of light-
minded passions’ (ἁ γὰρ δὴ πολύπλαγκτος ἐλ- | πὶς πολλοῖς μὲν ὄνησις ἀνδρῶν, 
| πολλοῖς δ’ ἀπάτα κουφονόων ἐρώτων, 615-17), so that a man comes unawares 
to disaster (εἰδότι δ’ οὐδὲν ἕρπει, | πρὶν πυρὶ θερμῷ πόδα τις προσαύσῃ, 618-19); 
with wisdom has it been said, that bad seems good to one whose mind a god is 
leading towards ἄτη (σοφίᾳ γὰρ ἔκ του | κλεινὸν ἔπος πέφανται, | τὸ κακὸν 
δοκεῖν ποτ’ ἐσθλὸν | τῷδ’ ἔμμεν ὅτῳ φρένας | θεὸς ἄγει πρὸς ἄταν, 620-4). Just 
so, in the first stasimon, man might rely ‘beyond hope’ on his wisdom, yet come 
now to bad, now to good (σοφόν τι τὸ μηχανόεν  | τέχνας ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδ’ ἔχων | 
τοτὲ μὲν κακόν, ἄλλοτ’ ἐπ’ ἐσθλὸν ἕρπει, 365-7). His passionate aims, in the 
second stasimon (κουφονόων ἐρώτων, 617), may in the end be as ‘light-minded’ as 
the birds he traps in his nets in the first (κουφονόων … ὀρνίθων, 342-3).
20
 
 
                                                 
20
 Cf. Susanetti (2012) 229 on 342. 
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2.2. Second stasimon, Solon, and Aeschylus 
Not all of these thematic and verbal correspondences are equally salient; but it does 
not matter much whether an audience catches all or only some of them, because all 
serve a single overall purpose, namely the contrast between (a) the potential of 
human reason and (b) its limits and failings. This contrast is inherent in the first 
stasimon itself, but deepened and extended by means of the interrelationship of the 
first and the second. In its close relation with the first stasimon, the second stasimon 
inevitably also has a close relation with that ode’s intertexts – many of the second’s 
echoes of the first reverberate further in the poems that are the first’s main sources. 
But the second stasimon also brings in aspects of those sources that were either 
latent or inactive in the first stasimon. This is clearly so in case of ἄτη, which is 
prominent in both the Choephori ode and Solon’s Musenelegie. But it is also striking 
that activation of the Choephori’s reference to ἄτη also brings in its reference to 
ἔρως – as in Choephori 597-8 (and 600) ἄτη and ἔρωτες are linked at Antigone 617-
25: 
 
ἀλλ’ ὑπέρτολμον ἀν-  
δρὸς φρόνημα τίς λέγοι (595) 
καὶ γυναικῶν φρεσὶν  
τλημόνων παντόλμους  
ἔρωτας, ἄταισι συννόμους βροτῶν; 
ἁ γὰρ δὴ πολύπλαγκτος ἐλ-  (615) 
πὶς πολλοῖς μὲν ὄνησις ἀνδρῶν, 
πολλοῖς δ’ ἀπάτα κουφονόων ἐρώτων· 
εἰδότι δ’ οὐδὲν ἕρπει, 
πρὶν πυρὶ θερμῷ πόδα τις προσαύσῃ. 
σοφίᾳ γὰρ ἔκ του (620) 
κλεινὸν ἔπος πέφανται, 
τὸ κακὸν δοκεῖν ποτ’ ἐσθλὸν 
τῷδ’ ἔμμεν ὅτῳ φρένας 
θεὸς ἄγει πρὸς ἄταν· 
πράσσει δ’ ὀλίγιστoν χρόνον ἐκτὸς ἄτας. (625) 
 
These lines encapsulate what ἄτη is – a person has an aim in acting, hopes the 
outcome will be good, and acts; but one never knows how things will turn out; and 
so we realize we have made a calamitous mistake only when disaster strikes.
21
 This 
is precisely Solon’s characterization of ἄτη at 13. 63-70 (with verbal parallels with 
both the first and the second stasima in Antigone): 
 
Μοῖρα δέ τοι θνητοῖσι κακὸν φέρει ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν, 
δῶρα δ’ ἄφυκτα θεῶν γίγνεται ἀθανάτων. 
                                                 
21
 On the meaning of ἄτη, and in particular the focal meaning of ‘harm’ (βλάβη) that links its so-
called ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ senses, see Cairns (2012), 1-10; see also Sommerstein (2013).  
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πᾶσι δέ τοι κίνδυνος ἐπ’ ἔργμασιν, οὐδέ τις οἶδεν    65 
πῇ μέλλει σχήσειν χρήματος ἀρχομένου· 
ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν εὖ ἔρδειν πειρώμενος οὐ προνοήσας 
 ἐς μεγάλην ἄτην καὶ χαλεπὴν ἔπεσεν, 
τῷ δὲ κακῶς ἔρδοντι θεὸς περὶ πάντα δίδωσιν 
συντυχίην ἀγαθήν, ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης.     70 
 
That passage, however, forms a ring with an earlier one in the same poem  (Sol. 13. 
33-6): 
 
θνητοὶ δ’ ὧδε νοέομεν ὁμῶς ἀγαθός τε κακός τε 
 εὖ ῥεῖν ἣν αὐτὸς δόξαν ἕκαστος ἔχει, 
πρίν τι παθεῖν· τότε δ’ αὖτις ὀδύρεται· ἄχρι δὲ τούτου   35 
 χάσκοντες κούφαις ἐλπίσι τερπόμεθα. 
 
Compare Ant. 618-19: 
 
εἰδότι δ’ οὐδὲν ἕρπει, 
πρὶν πυρὶ θερμῷ πόδα τις προσαύσῃ. 
 
In Solon, this limitation defines the gulf between man and god. It vindicates the 
power of Zeus. Solon expresses this in an elaborate chiasmus: 
 
A 17-32 power of Zeus  ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πάντων ἐφορᾷ τέλος … τοιαύτη  
Ζηνὸς πέλεται τίσις … ἀναίτιοι ἔργα τίνουσιν | ἢ παῖδες 
τούτων ἢ γένος ἐξοπίσω 
B 33-5 human ignorance θνητοὶ δ’ ὧδε νοέομεν ὁμῶς ἀγαθός τε κακός τε, 
     εὖ ῥεῖν ἣν αὐτὸς δόξαν ἕκαστος ἔχει, 
πρίν τι παθεῖν· τότε δ’ αὖτις ὀδύρεται· (35) 
B´ 63-70 human ignorance Μοῖρα δέ τοι θνητοῖσι κακὸν φέρει ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν, 
δῶρα δ’ ἄφυκτα θεῶν γίγνεται ἀθανάτων. 
πᾶσι δέ τοι κίνδυνος ἐπ’ ἔργμασιν, οὐδέ τις οἶδεν (65) 
πῇ μέλλει σχήσειν χρήματος ἀρχομένου· 
ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν εὖ ἔρδειν πειρώμενος οὐ προνοήσας 
ἐς μεγάλην ἄτην καὶ χαλεπὴν ἔπεσεν, 
τῷ δὲ κακῶς ἔρδοντι θεὸς περὶ πάντα δίδωσιν 
      συντυχίην ἀγαθήν, ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης. (70) 
A´ 75-6 power of Zeus ἄτη δ’ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνεται, ἣν ὁπότε Ζεὺς (75) 
       πέμψῃ τεισομένην, ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει. 
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In Antigone, the sequence is simpler: A  (power of Zeus, 604-14), B  (human 
ignorance, 615-25). 
At the same time, however, Sophocles’ lines 615-19 interweave (a) an echo of 
the first stasimon (hope and its ambivalence at 365-7), (b) an echo of the source 
passage in Choephori (the ἔρωτες of Cho. 597), and (c) an echo of Solon 13, where 
the κοῦφαι ἐλπίδες of Sol. 13. 36 are recalled in the ἐλπίς that is nothing but the 
ἀπάτα of light-minded ἔρωτες. We should notice, too, that Solon’s image of Zeus’ 
power (at 13. 17-24, ἐξαπίνης δὲ | ὥστ’ ἄνεμος νεφέλας αἶψα διεσκέδασεν | 
ἠρινός κτλ.) is one of a storm that begins at sea, as in both the first and second 
stasima in Antigone (334-7, 583-92). 
Solon’s poem deals above all with the improper pursuit of πλοῦτος and ὄλβος. 
Ἄτη is especially relevant in this connexion because of its regular appearance as an 
antonym of κέρδος (where its regular sense, ‘ruin’, takes on a specifically financial 
form).
22
 See especially Sol. 13. 70-6: 
 
πλούτου δ’ οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται· 
οἳ γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων πλεῖστον ἔχουσι βίον, 
διπλάσιον σπεύδουσι· τίς ἂν κορέσειεν ἅπαντας; 
κέρδεά τοι θνητοῖς ὤπασαν ἀθάνατοι, 
ἄτη δ’ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνεται, ἣν ὁπότε Ζεὺς     75 
πέμψῃ τεισομένην, ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει. 
 
Κέρδος, of course, is a substantial theme in Antigone; but it is one that we do not 
have time to explore in detail here.
23
 A particular temptation of those who pursue 
material gain is ὕβρις – also prominent in Solon 13 and regularly linked to ἄτη by 
metaphors of growth and nutrition: honouring wealth with ὕβρις leads to ἄτη at Sol. 
13. 11-13, and the nutritional metaphor is implicit in τίς ἂν κορέσειεν ἅπαντας 
with reference to the κέρδεα that lead to ἄτη at 13. 73-5. There is not much of this 
in the second stasimon of the Antigone: but at 613-14 no great wealth (or nothing 
great) comes to mortals without ἄτη. If the harvesting of the last root of the House 
of Oedipus (599-603) is an example of the ἄτη that will never leave the Labdacids 
alone, then we may have a latent example of the metaphor of exuberant growth, of 
                                                 
22
 See Sommerstein (2013), 2; cf. Cairns (2012), 1 n. 2, both with references. For a clear play on ἄτη 
as both ‘loss’ (as opposed to profit) and ‘disaster’, see Thgn. 119 (and cf. 133, 205-6).  
23
 See rather Cairns (2013), xxi-xxii, xxv, xxix, xxxi-xxxiii. Cf. Goheen (1951), 14-19. 
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over-fullness, and of the crop of disaster that we find (for example) in Solon 4. 34-5 
W, Aeschylus, Persae 821-2, and Septem 601.
24
 
However that may be, in its relation to Solon 13, what the second stasimon does 
is to bring in the emphasis on the instability of human happiness, the ambivalence of 
wealth and prosperity, and the dangers of ἄτη in Solon’s poem that were implicitly 
present, by virtue of their very absence, in the first stasimon. The evocation of Solon 
in the second stasimon strengthens conclusions about the relation between the first 
stasimon and its sources in Solon and Aeschylus that an attentive audience will, at 
least provisionally, have drawn. Ἄτη is, through these intertexts, an absent presence 
in the first stasimon, as well as the dominant presence in its own right in the 
second.
25
 
There is, however, one important aspect of Solon’s Musenelegie that we have 
not yet considered: the affirmation (in lines 27-32) that Zeus’ punishment never fails, 
even if it falls on the transgressor’s children or grandchildren. This link with the 
second stasimon’s account of the generations of suffering (suffering that is caused, 
perhaps, by some ὑπερβασία, 605) in the House of Labdacus takes us into different 
territory and a different intertext, Aeschylus’ Septem contra Thebas. 
This is a well-known intertext, so I can be brief. But the correspondences 
between the second stasimon of the Antigone and Septem 720-91 (which places the 
imminent conflict between Eteocles and Polynices in the context of the sufferings 
and transgressions of the House of Labdacus) are very striking.
26
 The following 
table sets out those that are most relevant to the subject of this paper. 
 
Second Stasimon, 582-625: 
εὐδαίμονες οἷσι κακῶν ἄγευστος αἰών.  
οἷς γὰρ ἂν σεισθῇ θεόθεν δόμος, ἄτας  
οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει γενεᾶς ἐπὶ πλῆθος ἕρπον· (585) 
ὥστε ποντίας ἁλὸς 
οἶδμα δυσπνόοις ὅταν 
Θρῄσσησιν ἔρεβος ὕφαλον ἐπιδράμῃ πνοαῖς, 
κυλίνδει βυσσόθεν (590) 
Aeschylus, Septem 720-91: 
 
 
 
κακῶν δ’ ὥσπερ θάλασσα κῦμ’ ἄγει,  
τὸ μὲν πίτνον, ἄλλο δ’ ἀείρει 
τρίχαλον, ὃ καὶ περὶ πρύμναν πόλεως  
                                    καχλάζει. (758-60) 
                                                 
24
 Pace Easterling (1978), 147. The link between ὑπερβασία and ἄτη in the second stasimon (605-
15) recalls that between ὑπερβασία, ὕβρις, and ἄτη in the preceding episode at 480-5. See Cairns 
(2013), xvi-xvii. 
25
 The relation between the first and second stasima, and between both and their interetexts, thus 
exemplifies what Dunn (2012) has identified as the dynamic force of Sophoclean intertextuality. 
26
 On the specific debt to Septem 720-91 (with 653ff. and 875-1004), see Else (1976), 16-24 (esp. 16-
18), 28; cf. Bowra (1944), 87; Ditmars (1992), 77-9. Gagné (2013) 373 is more sceptical.The Septem 
is similarly a prominent comparator for Antigone’s parodos (100-54): see Else (1976), 35-40; 
Davidson (1983), 41, 43-8; Dunn (2012), 268-70; Rodighiero (2012), 108. 
JASCA 2 (2014) 
 18 
κελαινὰν θῖνα καὶ δυσάνεμοι 
στόνῳ βρέμουσιν ἀντιπλῆγες ἀκταί. 
 
ἀρχαῖα τὰ Λαβδακιδᾶν οἴκων ὁρῶμαι  
πήματα φθιτῶν ἐπὶ πήμασι πίπτοντ’, (595)  
οὐδ’ ἀπαλλάσσει γενεὰν γένος, ἀλλ’ ἐρείπει 
θεῶν τις, οὐδ’ ἔχει λύσιν. 
νῦν γὰρ ἐσχάτας ὑπὲρ
27
  
ῥίζας ἐτέτατο φάος ἐν Οἰδίπου δόμοις·(600) 
κατ’ αὖ νιν φοινία 
θεῶν τῶν νερτέρων ἀμᾷ κόνις, 
λόγου τ’ ἄνοια καὶ φρενῶν Ἐρινύς. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
τεάν, Ζεῦ, δύνασιν τίς ἀν-  
δρῶν ὑπερβασία κατάσχοι; (605)  
τὰν οὔθ’ ὕπνος αἱρεῖ ποθ’ ὁ †παντογήρως† 
οὔτ’ ἀκάματοι θεῶν 
μῆνες, ἀγήρως δὲ χρόνῳ δυνάστας 
κατέχεις Ὀλύμπου 
μαρμαρόεσσαν αἴγλαν.  (610)    
τό τ’ ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ μέλλον 
καὶ τὸ πρὶν ἐπαρκέσει  
νόμος ὅδ’· οὐδέν’ ἕρπει 
θνατῶν βίοτος πάμπολυς ἐκτὸς ἄτας. 
 
ἁ γὰρ δὴ πολύπλαγκτος ἐλ-  (615) 
πὶς πολλοῖς μὲν ὄνησις ἀνδρῶν, 
πολλοῖς δ’ ἀπάτα κουφονόων ἐρώτων· 
εἰδότι δ’ οὐδὲν ἕρπει, 
πρὶν πυρὶ θερμῷ πόδα τις προσαύσῃ. 
σοφίᾳ γὰρ ἔκ του (620) 
κλεινὸν ἔπος πέφανται, 
τὸ κακὸν δοκεῖν ποτ’ ἐσθλὸν 
τῷδ’ ἔμμεν ὅτῳ φρένας 
θεὸς ἄγει πρὸς ἄταν· 
πράσσει δ’ ὀλίγιστoν χρόνον ἐκτὸς ἄτας.  (625) 
 
 
 
ὦ 
πόνοι δόμων νέοι παλαι-  
οῖσι συμμιγεῖς κακοῖς. (739-41) 
 
 
(a) ῥίζαν αἱματόεσσαν (755) 
(b) [ἐπεὶ δ’ ἂν] γαΐα κόνις  
πίῃ μελαμπαγὲς αἷμα φοίνιον (735-6) 
(c)  παναληθῆ κακόμαντιν 
πατρὸς εὐκταίαν Ἐρινὺν 
τελέσαι τὰς περιθύμους 
κατάρας Οἰδιπόδα βλαψίφρονος (722-5) 
(d)  νῦν δὲ τρέω  
μὴ τελέσῃ καμψίπους Ἐρινύς. (790-1) 
(e)  παράνοια συνᾶγε 
νυμφίους φρενώλης (756-7) 
 
 
παλαιγενῆ γὰρ λέγω  
παρβασίαν ὠκύποινον (742-3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
πρόπρυμνα δ’ ἐκβολὰν φέρει  
ἀνδρῶν ἀλφηστᾶν  
ὄλβος ἄγαν παχυνθείς (769-71) 
                                                 
27
 For MSS’ ὑπὲρ, followed by asyndeton, rather than readings/emendations which introduce a 
relative (ὅπερ, K/Hermann; ὑπὲρ ῥίζας ὃ τέτατο, Hermann), see Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990), 
129; Ferrari (2010), 52-3. To regularize the responsion with 588-9 Brunck (followed by Lloyd-Jones 
and Wilson) emends MSS’ τέτατο to ἐτέτατο. Ferrari (2010), 53 believes that τέτατο can stand. 
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A number of these correspondences deserve to be taken further.
28
 But for immediate 
purposes, the point is simply that the obvious links with this crucial ode in Septem 
help to reinforce two prominent aspects of the second stasimon of Antigone: (a) the 
notion of inherited suffering that is already there in the link with Solon and (b) the 
emphasis on irrational forces – Erinyes, on the one hand, but also various forms of 
mental impairment, on the other. Ἄτη does not occur as such in Septem 720-91, but 
it is prominent in the immediate context (601, 687) as a significant aspect of what it 
means for Eteocles to face his brother in battle. The term occurs a further three times 
in play (315, 956, 1001); παράνοια in 756 is another word for ἄτη in its subjective 
sense; and βλαψίφρων, of Oedipus at 725, is a clear synonym of 
ἀεσίφρων/ἀασίφρων.29 
This trawl through Solon and Aeschylus does not exhaust the potential for 
identifying significant parallels with the first and second stasima of Antigone. A 
number of general similarities with particular passages of archaic poetry and 
Aeschylean tragedy could also be mentioned.
30
 But in such cases we are dealing 
with parallels; what we have in the cases discussed above is something more specific 
– deliberate evocation of specific elements of well-known passages in a way that 
deepens an audience’s understanding of aspects of Antigone that are absolutely 
fundamental to a proper understanding of the play’s meaning. 
 
3. Ἄτη in Antigone 
The basic point that arises from this discussion is that the cornerstones of the 
inherited tradition of archaic Greek ethics – and especially the notion of ἄτη – are 
not confined to the second stasimon, but play a major role in Antigone as a whole.
31 
This is not just a matter of adding, in a few localized passages, a superficial 
colouring of traditional moral and religious thought;
32
 it is rather (as the interplay 
                                                 
28
 In particular, perhaps, the way that reading Antigone in its relation to Septem confirms MSS’ κόνις 
against Jortyn’s κοπίς in 602; also the implications of the references to ὑπερβασία at Ant. 605 and 
παρβασία at Septem 744. I hope to pursue the former discussion, at least, elsewhere. Meanwhile, for 
a good recent defence of κόνις, see Ferrari (2010), 54-7. 
29
 βλαψίφρων glosses ἀεσίφρων at Apoll. Soph. Lex. Hom. 2. 7 Bekker, Hsch. α 28, Et. Mag. 20. 
49-50, Σ bT on Il. 23. 603, and qualifies ἄτη at Triphiod. 411. Other βλάβη-words, such as 
φρενοβλάβεια, are regular glosses for ἄτη. See Dawe (1968), 101, 105; Stallmach (1968), 44; Cairns 
(2012) 42 n. 100; cf. above, n. 21, and below, n. 47, on ἄτη and βλάβη. 
30
 Many more examples in Cairns (2013). 
31
 On ἄτη in Antigone, cf. Else (1976), 26-7, 31, 76. 
32
 Pace the implication of (e.g.) Griffith (1999), 229, on 613-14.  
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between the first and second stasima already shows) an integral and important aspect 
of the play’s design. I have argued this position at length in my introductory chapter 
to Tragedy and Archaic Greek Thought, and so shall not rehearse it in detail here. At 
the same time, however, the main points of that argument are also the main 
implications of the evidence as discussed in this paper, and so an element of 
summary is required. 
The second stasimon is explicitly prompted by Antigone’s own situation and 
especially by the transgression that she admitted and Creon condemned in the 
second episode. But there is also plenty of support throughout the play for the 
analysis that the Chorus offer in that ode of her situation and her conduct. The word 
ἄτη is used of her and her family;
33
 her heredity is emphasized;
34
 and she is accused 
of folly, insanity, and transgression throughout the play.
35
 There is material here for 
an Aeschylean/Solonian picture of a family doomed by the actions of its previous 
generations, for the notion of the Labdacids as a house that must be extirpated if the 
state is to regain its health.
36
 Given the prevalence of disruption, madness, and 
irrationality – qualities that are predicated of a number of characters and permeate 
                                                 
33
 See 4 (corrupt, but almost certainly referring to the history of ἄτη in Antigone’s family), 17 (the 
family’s ills referred to as ἀτᾶσθαι), 485 (Antigone will not defy Creon ‘without ἄτη’), 863-5 (the 
ἆται of her parents’ incest). 
34
 See the Chorus at 379-80 (‘unhappy child of an unhappy father’), 471-2 (she has inherited her 
father’s ‘raw’, ὠμόν, temperament), 856 (her ordeal is payment for some debt incurred by her father). 
Cf. Antigone herself at 857-67 (her father’s travails, those of the entire Labdacid clan, the ἆται of her 
parents’ incest, and the wretchedness of her own state: she goes to join them ‘accursed and unwed’, 
ἀραῖος ἄγαμος), 892-6 (her troubles are the latest instalment of her family’s). The use of the 
adjective ἀραῖος at 867 is the only positive indication in the play that the sufferings of Antigone may 
have an origin in an actual curse, but such is the play’s evocation of Aeschylus’ Theban trilogy that 
this may be enough to trigger the thought in an audience’s mind. For different views on this, see 
Lloyd-Jones (1971), 115-16; West (1999), 40-1; Sewell-Rutter (2007), 71, 114-20. 
35
 See Ismene at 67-8 (Antigone’s proposal to defy Creon’s edict exhibits no νοῦς), 90 (she is ‘in love 
with the impossible’; cf. ‘hunting the impossible’, 92), 99 (she is ἄνους); cf. Antigone herself at 74 
(πανουργία), 95 (δυσβουλία). The reference to ἔρως in 90 relates both to the hope that, for many, 
represents the ‘deception of light-minded passions’ (ἔρωτες) in the second stasimon at 617 and to the 
Chorus-leader’s statement at 220 that no one is so foolish as to be in love (ἔρως) with death (a 
generalization that is ironically contradicted by Antigone’s behaviour). See also the Chorus on her 
defiance of ‘the king’s laws’ (382), her ἀφροσύνη (383), her ‘advance to the limit of daring’ (853), 
her ‘fall before the pedestal of Justice’ (854-5), her self-willed παραβασία (873-4); Creon on her 
ἄνοια (561-2), her ὑπερβασία (663-5).  But note esp. Creon’s charge of ὑπερβασία, 449, and 
Antigone’s defiance (450-70); this is a token of her inherited savagery, according to the Chorus at 
471-2, and of ὕβρις, according to Creon (480-5). Cf. therefore the explicit reference to ὑπερβασία in 
the second stasimon at 605 and the implicit evocation of the ‘archaic chain’ of κόρος, ὕβρις, and ἄτη 
at 613-14. 
36
 For the development of this line of argument see Else (1976). 
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the play
37
  – it is possible to regard Antigone as in some way driven by forces 
beyond her control, perhaps as a victim of ἄτη. But this is also questionable; and it 
is a question that is raised by Antigone herself.  This is 925-8, almost her last words 
in the play: 
 
ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν οὖν τάδ’ ἐστὶν ἐν θεοῖς καλά,    925 
παθόντες ἂν ξυγγνοῖμεν ἡμαρτηκότες· 
εἰ δ’ οἵδ’ ἁμαρτάνουσι, μὴ πλείω κακὰ 
πάθοιεν ἢ καὶ δρῶσιν ἐκδίκως ἐμέ. 
 
Antigone certainly suffers; but is this the kind of suffering that arises from error? Is 
it ἄτη? In lines 925-8 the results are not yet apparent; but Antigone, at least, is 
confident that she is not the one who has erred. Her view that the error is Creon’s, 
and not hers, will be vindicated, she says, if what happens to him resembles what 
happens to her. And so it turns out, in ways with which we are all familiar – Creon 
becomes a ‘living corpse’ (a liminal figure between two worlds, like Polynices and 
Antigone);
38
 he loses a son, as he came between Antigone and her brother; and he 
loses his wife, as he came between Antigone and Haemon. In some ways, though 
Creon is a descendant of the Spartoi, he becomes an honorary Labdacid: like Laius, 
he is confronted by a son who tries to kill him; like Oedipus, his actions cause his 
wife’s suicide.39 
All of this, quite explicitly, is Creon’s ἄτη. Solon’s strictures regarding our 
inability to foresee the consequences of our actions are implicit in the substantial 
hostage to fortune that Creon offers in 175-7: 
                                                 
37
 Of Antigone: see esp. 603 (cf. also above, n. 35); of Creon: 765 (cf. 755); of Haemon: 633 
(hypothetically; cf. 648-9), 754; cf. 790 (of the one who ‘has Eros’, i.e. Haemon; but NB ἐρᾶν used 
of Antigone at 90 and, indirectly, at 220), 1231; of Eurydice: 1254. Cf. Creon of Ismene, 491-2. Cf. 
the frenzy (οἶστρος) of the birds whose unintelligible cries Tiresias reports at 1001-2, and various 
references to the destructive power of forces such as ὀργή and θυμός (718, 766-7, 875, 955-6); also 
the ambivalent presence of Dionysus in the parodos, fourth stasimon, and fifth stasimon (134-7, of 
the madness of Capaneus; 153-4, Dionysus as leader of celebratory choruses; 955-65, Lycurgus’ mad 
attempt to stop the god’s mad women; 1116-52, invoked to come, with his frenzied female followers, 
and heal the city). 
38
 See 1165-7, 1288, 1320-5; cf. Antigone on her own plight at 559-60 and 850-2, Tiresias on the 
anomalous liminality of Antigone and Polynices at 1068-71 (a predicament which, he predicts, awaits 
Creon himself, 1076). 
39
 See Loraux (1986), 183-4; Goldhill (1986), 104-5; Zeitlin (1990), 150-1; Segal (1995), 131; Liapis 
(2013), 103-7. For Else (1976), 81-96, Sophocles develops this pattern by basing his characterization 
of Creon in Antigone on that of Oedipus in Aeschylus’ (lost) Oedipus, a phenomenon that explains 
the similarities in characterization between the Creon of Antigone and the Oedipus of Oedipus 
Tyrannus, similarly based on the Aeschylean model. But this is pure speculation. 
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ἀμήχανον δὲ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐκμαθεῖν    175 
ψυχήν τε καὶ φρόνημα καὶ γνώμην, πρὶν ἂν 
ἀρχαῖς τε καὶ νόμοισιν ἐντριβὴς φανῇ. 
 
Creon’s γνώμη has an impeccable ‘archaic’ pedigree,40 but he is also using words 
and ideas that are then probed in both the first stasimon and the second. Almost 
immediately afterwards (184-6), Creon expresses his determination to speak up 
should he see ἄτη advancing on his fellow citizens: 
 
ἐγὼ γάρ, ἴστω Ζεὺς ὁ πάνθ’ ὁρῶν ἀεί, 
οὔτ’ ἂν σιωπήσαιμι τὴν ἄτην ὁρῶν     185 
στείχουσαν ἀστοῖς ἀντὶ τῆς σωτηρίας … 
 
But ἄτη (disaster), when one is in the grip of ἄτη (delusion or error), is not the kind 
of thing that one sees coming. Zeus sees everything; Zeus knows (184); Creon does 
not. In the end, as Tiresias makes clear (1015), Creon himself is the one who 
threatens the city’s safety. As the Chorus point out, and as he himself accepts, this is 
his ἄτη (1257-69): 
 
Χο.  καὶ μὴν ὅδ’ ἄναξ αὐτὸς ἐφήκει 
  μνῆμ’ ἐπίσημον διὰ χειρὸς ἔχων, 
  εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἀλλοτρίαν 
  ἄτην, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς ἁμαρτών.     1260 
Κρ.  ἰὼ 
  φρενῶν δυσφρόνων ἁμαρτήματα 
  στερεὰ θανατόεντ’ , 
  ὦ κτανόντας τε καὶ 
  θανόντας βλέποντες ἐμφυλίους. 
  ὤμοι ἐμῶν ἄνολβα βουλευμάτων.    1265 
  ἰὼ παῖ, νέος νέῳ ξὺν μόρῳ, 
  αἰαῖ αἰαῖ, 
  ἔθανες, ἀπελύθης, 
  ἐμαῖς οὐδὲ σαῖσι δυσβουλίαις. 
                                                 
40
 Cf. Arist. EN 5. 1, 1130a1-2: καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει, 
with Bowra (1944), 69; Budelmann and Easterling (2010), 299. 
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In his opening speech, Creon stressed the importance of good leadership and aspired 
to manifest what is regarded as one of the most important qualities of a good 
political leader, the ability to foresee how one’s current situation is likely to 
develop.
41
 The first and second stasima together re-emphasize the uncertainty of the 
future and the limits of human beings’ ability to control their own destinies. Good 
intentions can have bad results. In Creon’s case, Tiresias is, initially, prepared to 
take a sympathetic view of his error (1023-4): 
 
ταῦτ’ οὖν, τέκνον, φρόνησον. ἀνθρώποισι γὰρ 
τοῖς πᾶσι κοινόν ἐστι τοὐξαμαρτάνειν.
42 
 
But the fact that it is Tiresias who provides authoritative confirmation of Creon’s 
lapse into error takes us back to the first stasimon, where the issue of man’s 
resourcefulness with regard to the future was first explicitly raised (360-1) and 
where the intertextual link with Solon’s Musenelegie implied a distinction between 
the limited foresight of ordinary human beings and the specialist craft of the seer.
43
 
There is more to the ἄτη-sequence in Creon’s case than this; and its 
implications are considerable. In Tragedy and Archaic Greek Thought I try to 
explore in detail the application of the ideas of the second stasimon to Creon and the 
links between ἄτη (and its partial synonym, ἁμαρτία) and the pervasive theme of 
wisdom and folly, as well as its links (especially via its antonym, κέρδος) with the 
themes of material versus other forms of prosperity, and the contribution that this 
dialectic makes to the play’s reflexions on the nature of εὐδαιμονία. In this context, 
however, I want to end with just one final point – one more example of how the 
centrality of ἄτη to the understanding of the play is underpinned by intertextuality. 
Tiresias exits at 1090, but his warnings and prophecies alarm the Coryphaeus 
(1091-4), and Creon shares his concern (1095-7): 
 
ἔγνωκα καὐτὸς καὶ ταράσσομαι φρένας· 
                                                 
41
 Already at e.g. Il. 1. 343-4, but see esp. Themistocles at Thuc. 1. 138. 3 and Pericles at 2. 62-3, 2. 
65. 6 (also at Plut. Comp. Per. Fab. 2. 3); cf. Phormio at Thuc. 2. 89. 2; Nicias at 6. 13. 1. See also D. 
18. 246. For Plato’s Socrates, the ability to foresee and forestall future trouble is the mark of a good 
doctor, lawgiver, and beekeeper (Resp. 564c). 
42
 For the thought, cf. Thgn. 327-8; E. Hipp. 615, 916, 1434, Supp. 250-1; Rhet. Alex. 36. 35; and the 
further passages cited by Pearson (1917) on S. fr. 665 Radt. As Pearson observes, the thought is 
commonplace, but by no means trivial. 
43
 Cf. Sano, this volume, 36-7, 40. 
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τό τ’ εἰκαθεῖν γὰρ δεινόν, ἀντιστάντα δὲ 
Ἄτης πατάξαι θυμὸν ἐν λίνῳ πάρα.44 
 
Creon must act quickly, or it will be too late: ‘the gods’ swift-footed Harms cut off 
the wrongheaded’ (1103-4): 
 
ὅσον γ’, ἄναξ, τάχιστα· συντέμνουσι γὰρ 
θεῶν ποδώκεις τοὺς κακόφρονας Βλάβαι.   1104 
 
As a parallel for the swift-footed Blabai one might think of the ‘swift-footed Erinys’ 
of Septem 791; but their true progenitor is the personified Ate who features in the 
Iliad’s allegory of the Litai (9. 496-514):45 
 
“ἀλλ' Ἀχιλεῦ δάμασον θυμὸν μέγαν· οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ 
νηλεὲς ἦτορ ἔχειν· στρεπτοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί, 
τῶν περ καὶ μείζων ἀρετὴ τιμή τε βίη τε. 
καὶ μὲν τοὺς θυέεσσι καὶ εὐχωλῇς ἀγανῇσι 
λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρωπῶσ' ἄνθρωποι    500 
λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἁμάρτῃ. 
καὶ γάρ τε λιταί εἰσι Διὸς κοῦραι μεγάλοιο 
χωλαί τε ῥυσαί τε παραβλῶπές τ' ὀφθαλμώ, 
αἵ ῥά τε καὶ μετόπισθ' ἄτης ἀλέγουσι κιοῦσαι. 
ἣ δ' ἄτη σθεναρή τε καὶ ἀρτίπος, οὕνεκα πάσας  505 
πολλὸν ὑπεκπροθέει, φθάνει δέ τε πᾶσαν ἐπ' αἶαν 
                                                 
44
 Lloyd-Jones’s and Wilson’s text, with Lloyd-Jones’s own Ἄτης ... λίνῳ for MSS’ Ἄτῃ ... δεινῷ in 
1097 (Lloyd-Jones 1964). Lloyd-Jones (1964), 129 translates ‘by offering resistance my anger may 
strike against the net of Ate’, but taking ἀντιστάντα as referring to Creon, the subject, and θυμόν as 
object of πατάξαι (‘accusative of the thing set in motion’, LSJ s.v. πατάσσω, II) gives the verb its 
regular sense. I translate: ‘To give in is terrible, but to stand firm may be to strike one’s θυμός on 
Ate’s net.’ Professor Tetsuo Nakatsukasa points out to me that πατάξαι θυμόν (with θυμός as 
subject) would recall the Homeric θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι πάτασσεν (Il. 7. 216); I agree that this 
locution may have influenced Sophocles’ choice of words here, but doubt (unless the text is more 
corrupt than suspected) that the sense ‘my θυμός beats’ can made to play a role in this context. As 
for the paradosis, repetition of the adjective δεινός in both halves of the antithesis is unlikely without 
a modifier in the second half, such as καί, and ‘it is a terrible prospect to strike one’s θυμός with 
ἄτη’ is anyhow weak. The notion of Ate’s net, on the other hand, has good Aeschylean pedigree 
(Pers. 97-9, Ag. 355-61; cf. Pr. 1071-9), on which cf. Sommerstein (2013), 6-7, 15 n. 36. For an 
alternative emendation, see Dawe (1968), 113-14 n. 40. 
45
 Remarkably, the clear link between the two passages is (as far as I have seen) recognized only by 
Dawe (1968), 113-14 n. 49. 
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βλάπτουσ' ἀνθρώπους· αἳ δ' ἐξακέονται ὀπίσσω. 
ὃς μέν τ' αἰδέσεται κούρας Διὸς ἆσσον ἰούσας, 
τὸν δὲ μέγ' ὤνησαν καί τ' ἔκλυον εὐχομένοιο· 
ὃς δέ κ' ἀνήνηται καί τε στερεῶς ἀποείπῃ,   510 
λίσσονται δ' ἄρα ταί γε Δία Κρονίωνα κιοῦσαι 
τῷ ἄτην ἅμ' ἕπεσθαι, ἵνα βλαφθεὶς ἀποτίσῃ. 
ἀλλ' Ἀχιλεῦ πόρε καὶ σὺ Διὸς κούρῃσιν ἕπεσθαι 
τιμήν, ἥ τ' ἄλλων περ ἐπιγνάμπτει νόον ἐσθλῶν.” 
 
Not only does this passage demonstrate the relation between ἄτη and ἁμαρτία – an 
important point if we want to understand the importance of ἄτη in Antigone46 – it is 
also one of many passages that illustrate ἄτη’s core or focal meaning, ‘harm’. Ἄτη 
and βλάβη are synonyms.
47
 In Iliad 9, ἄτη harms people (βλάπτουσ᾽, 9. 507), and 
when the ἄτη of the original offence gives way to the ἄτη of the victim who refuses 
reparation, that person is harmed (βλαφθείς, 512). The personified Ate is ‘strong 
and sound of foot’ (9. 505), and so can outrun the Litai (504-7); just so, the 
Coryphaeus’ Blabai are swift-footed and outrun the imprudent (1103-4). 
Ἄτη plays a central role in the plot and thematic structure of the Iliad: Phoenix’s 
allegory in Book 9 is the fulcrum of a balance between the ἄτη of Agamemnon, 
which causes the quarrel and its disastrous results, and that of Achilles, which lies in 
his rejection of the Embassy and results in the death of Patroclus.
48
 In the Antigone, 
the evocation of this passage comes at the point at which we begin to discern the 
balance between the sufferings that await Creon and those that he has imposed upon 
Antigone. This represents the fulfilment of Antigone’s wish that Creon’s ἁμαρτία 
should involve him in suffering as painful as her own, and of Tiresias’ prophecy that 
Creon will be caught in the same evils as he inflicted upon Antigone and Polynices 
(1074-6): 
 
τούτων σε λωβητῆρες ὑστεροφθόροι 
λοχῶσιν Ἅιδου καὶ θεῶν Ἐρινύες,     1075 
ἐν τοῖσιν αὐτοῖς τοῖσδε ληφθῆναι κακοῖς. 
 
                                                 
46
 See e.g. 925-8, fulfilled in 1259-60. See further Dawe (1968); cf. Bremer (1969), 99-134. 
47
 See Dawe (1968), esp. 104-5; Stallmach (1968), esp. 1, 12-14, 24, 29, 31, 46-7, 59, 63, 80-4, 88, 
94-5, 102; Padel (1995), 167-92; Cairns (2012), with further references, ancient and modern, in 1 n. 
1; Sommerstein (2013). 
48
 For a full defence of this position, see Cairns (2012), 26-33. 
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These evils come upon him after he has rejected Tiresias’ advice to heal his errors 
by changing his mind (1023-32): 
 
ταῦτ’ οὖν, τέκνον, φρόνησον. ἀνθρώποισι γὰρ 
τοῖς πᾶσι κοινόν ἐστι τοὐξαμαρτάνειν· 
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἁμάρτῃ, κεῖνος οὐκέτ’ ἔστ’ ἀνὴρ    1025 
ἄβουλος οὐδ’ ἄνολβος, ὅστις ἐς κακὸν 
πεσὼν ἀκεῖται μηδ’ ἀκίνητος πέλει. 
αὐθαδία τοι σκαιότητ’ ὀφλισκάνει. 
ἀλλ’ εἶκε τῷ θανόντι, μηδ’ ὀλωλότα 
κέντει. τίς ἀλκὴ τὸν θανόντ’ ἐπικτανεῖν;    1030 
εὖ σοι φρονήσας εὖ λέγω· τὸ μανθάνειν δ’ 
ἥδιστον εὖ λέγοντος, εἰ κέρδος λέγοι. 
 
Tiresias plays the role played by Phoenix in the Iliad, and ὅστις ἐς κακὸν | πεσὼν 
ἀκεῖται μηδ’ ἀκίνητος πέλει (1026-7) is another allusion to the allegory of the Litai, 
who ‘come after to heal the damage’ (αἳ δ’ ἐξακέονται ὀπίσσω, 507). There is also 
a direct relation to the first stasimon, where, as in Solon’s Musenelegie, medicine is 
the final element in the Priamel of human skills (363-4).
49
 Creon has brought illness, 
not cure; the skills he sought to apply have, in the words of the first stasimon, 
brought him to evil rather than to good (367); he begins the play ‘high in the city’ 
(ὑψίπολις, 370), but by failing to honour the laws of the land (or the laws of the 
earth) and the justice of the gods (368-9) he brings disaster on the city – he is 
ἄπολις (370). 
The Blabai that the Coryphaeus fears will overtake Creon if he does not remedy 
his folly in time (1103-4) are prefigured in the Erinyes who, according to Tiresias, 
lie in wait for him (1074-6, above). The words λωβητῆρες and ὑστεροφθόροι 
emphasize the harm that the Erinyes cause. ὑστεροφθόρος occurs only here in 
classical Greek. But Sophocles’ phrase is quoted by Eustathius on Il. 9. 506-7, where 
he notes that, in so far as they are ὑστεροφθόροι, the Erinyes of the Antigone 
resemble the Litai in Phoenix’s allegory, who see to it that Ate attends anyone who 
rejects them: 
 
                                                 
49
 Cf. Goheen (1951), 41-4; Segal (1964) 64 = (1986) 160. NB too the juxtaposition of medicine (57-
62) and seercraft (53-6) in Solon’s Priamel; the intervention of the seer, Tiresias, with his remedy for 
Creon’s error, further confirms seercraft’s absent presence in the first stasimon as a function of its 
intertextuality with the Musenelegie.  
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ἰστέον δὲ καὶ ὅτι Ἐριννύες μὲν “λωβητῆρες ὑστεροφθόροι” παρὰ Σοφοκλεῖ, 
Λιταὶ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν ἀκέονται ὀπίσω, ἤγουν ὕστερον, πλὴν καὶ αὐταί, εἰ μὴ 
ἀκουσθῶσιν, ὑστεροφθόροι γίνονται τῇ ὕστερον ἐπελεύσει τῆς Ἄτης, ὡς 
ῥηθήσεται, εἰς τοὺς μὴ ὑπακούσαντας.50 
 
Eustathius has seen the link between this passage of the Antigone and Iliad 9. That 
link is further substantiated by the way that Sophocles’ ὑστεροφθόρος so clearly 
recalls Aeschylus’ ὑστερόποινος, of Erinys at Ag. 58-9, but of Ate at Cho. 382-3.51 
Ate and Erinys are associated;
52
 and so in Antigone both 1074-6 (with Erinyes) and 
1103-4 (with Blabai) recall the Second Stasimon’s reference to λόγου τ’ ἄνοια καὶ 
φρενῶν Ἐρινύς as the psychological cause behind the disaster that is extinguishing 
the surviving light of the House of Labdacus (599-603). 
There, it was Antigone’s actions that were attributed to an Erinys. But whether 
or not this is accurate, Antigone’s actions do certainly have an effect on Creon, and 
the parallelism between her fate and his that she wished for in 927-8 is a real one. 
Creon has been destroyed by an Erinys, by Blabai, and by his own ἄτη – he erred 
his own ἄτη, no one else’s (1259-60, quoted above). But a very substantial role in 
his downfall was played by Antigone, one of the two ἄτα that Creon nurtured in his 
house (532-3).
53
 If Antigone, partly as a result of her Labdacid heritage, is driven by 
λόγου τ’ ἄνοια καὶ φρενῶν Ἐρινύς, the same madness and the same demons come 
in the end to engulf Creon. 
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